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1 Introduction
The choice of vertical boundary is a key decision for rms, as it has been
found to a¤ect rm performance and consequently economic growth (No-
vak and Stern, 2008; Forbes and Lederman, 2010). Indeed, this issue has
been extensively studied since Coases seminal work in 1937, with a focus
on the relationship specicity of investments and the degree of contractual
incompleteness. In recent years, researchers have begun to pay attention
to the impacts of institutional quality on the organization of production.
Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000) notice the prevalence of large and highly
vertically integrated rms in developing countries such as India. By study-
ing Indian business groups, they nd that a¢ liates of business groups of-
ten outperform una¢ liated rms. They suggest that the poorly functioning
market-supporting institutions in India make the benets of business groups
dominate the costs of group a¢ liation under certain circumstances. Although
their studies are related to vertical integration, the authors did not explicitly
examine the impacts of institutions, particularly contracting institutions, on
vertical integration in developing countries.
In this paper, using a cross-region data set from the worlds largest devel-
oping economy, China, we aim at identifying the direct impact of contracting
institutions on vertical integration.1 Meanwhile, following Acemoglu, John-
son, and Mitton (2009), and Macchiavello (2010a, 2010b), we also investigate
how contracting institutions may interact with nancial institutions in de-
termining the vertical boundary.
Our empirical analysis uses the data of a World Bank survey of 1,566
rms located in 18 cities and 9 manufacturing industries in China. China
o¤ers an ideal setting in which to study the impacts of the quality of con-
tracting institutions on vertical integration, because there exist substantial
variations in the de facto quality of contracting institutions across regions
in China as a result of substantial disparities in economic and institutional
development (e.g., Du, Lu and Tao, 2008; World Bank, 2008; Lu and Tao,
2009).2 Specically, we measure the quality of contracting institutions as
1Fan, Huang, Morck, and Yeung (2007) also examines how institutional quality (i.e.,
contract enforcement, government service, and market development) a¤ects the make-
or-buy decision. However, they use data of Chinas publicly-listed rms, which is not a
representative sample in China as these publicly-listed rms are large, vertically-integrated
and politically connected. Meanwhile, they do not even control for industry dummies in
their estimation, which is found to be important in identifying the impact of contracting
institutions on vertical integration (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009).
2For example, in coastal cities, it takes an average of 230 days to resolve an uncompli-
cated commercial dispute, whereas the corresponding number for Northeastern China is
363 days (World Bank, 2008).
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the perceived likelihood that the legal system would uphold contract and
property rights in business disputes (e.g., Johnson, McMillan, and Woodru¤,
2002; Cull and Xu, 2005). Meanwhile, we measure the degree of vertical
integration in two ways. One is the ratio of value added to sales, which is
the most widely-used measure in the literature (Adelman, 1955; Davies and
Morris, 1995; Holmes, 1999). The other is constructed on the basis of the
reply to the survey question of how large a proportion of inputs are produced
in-house by the rm itself.
Our basic OLS regression results show that the quality of contracting in-
stitutions has a direct, specically, negative and signicant, impact on rm
vertical integration. However, endogeneity could be a serious concern. For
instance, there could be a possibility of reverse causality. Entrepreneurs of
vertically integrated rms might have less need for outsourcing intermediate
goods, and thus have smaller chances to encounter commercial disputes with
their business partners. Then they might have less need to ask for court
adjudication; and this lack of experience with court resolution may cause
those entrepreneurs to have misperceptions of the quality of contracting in-
stitutions based on some stereotypes, which may well result in an underesti-
mation of the impact of contracting institutions. In addition, we could have
omitted variable bias. For example, a more capable entrepreneur may on
one hand have better connections that help her/him secure better de facto
contract enforcement, and on the other hand be capable of managing a more
vertically-integrated business. Hence, the lack of control for entrepreneurial
capability may again lead to an underestimation of the impact of contracting
institutions. To mitigate the potential biases stemming from the endogeneity
problem, we conduct a series of econometric analyses and robustness checks.
First, we check whether our results are biased due to some omitted vari-
ables. Specically, we include a list of control variables reecting the CEO
characteristics (such as human capital and political capital) and rm charac-
teristics (such as rm size, rm age, percentage of private ownership, access
to bank loans, and degree of computerization) as well as industry and city
dummies. Our results remain robust to the inclusion of these controls.
Second, to further deal with the possible endogeneity issue, we use the
two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) with two alternative in-
struments, viz., the average response by other rms located in the same city
regarding the quality of contracting institutions, and a dummy variable in-
dicating whether the respective city was administered by the Great Britain
in the late Qing Dynasty of Imperial China. The two-step GMM estimation
results reinforce our ndings that the quality of contracting institutions has
a negative impact on vertical integration.
Third, we apply the heterogeneous response method of Rajan and Zin-
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gales (1998). According to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009), the qual-
ity of contracting institutions has a greater impact on vertical boundary for
rms that are more susceptible to supplier hold-up problems. To proxy a
rms reliance on external suppliers, we use two alternative measures: num-
ber of suppliers as in Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Rajan and Subra-
manian (2007), and capital intensity as in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton
(2009). Our results show that indeed the negative impact of the quality of
contracting institutions on vertical integration is greater for rms with more
external reliance.
Finally, in further robustness checks, we repeat the analysis using an
alternative measure of vertical integration, an alternative measure of the
quality of contracting institutions, and three sub-samples of rms (i.e., rms
with focused businesses, private rms, and small rms). Again our results
remain robust in all these specications.
Our results point to a fairly robust direct impact of contracting institu-
tions on rm vertical boundary.3 As argued by Coase (1937), the decision of
vertical boundary hinges upon the external environment, the most important
component of which is arguably the institutional quality. Nonetheless, the
theoretical prediction of the direct e¤ect of institutions on vertical boundary
is ambiguous.4 There are two leading theories regarding the vertical bound-
ary of rm: the transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1971, 1985; Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian, 1978) and the property rights theory (Grossman and
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). According to the transaction cost theory,
rms are more likely to be vertically integrated when the market transaction
cost is higher. When legal institutions for contract enforcement are weak,
transaction costs in arms-length transactions are expected to be high. Given
that the transaction cost theory is largely silent about the transaction cost
within a rm, it predicts that an improvement in contracting institutions
will lead to less vertical integration. In contrast, the property rights the-
ory holds the view that the imperfection of contracting institutions a¤ects
both in-house production and arms-length transaction. When a rm deals
with an independent input supplier in arms-length transaction, the rm is
subject to the suppliers holdup problem. When the input supplier becomes
an employee in in-house production in the scenario of vertical integration,
3Our results di¤er from those of the existing studies such as Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Mitton (2009) primarily because of the lack of regional industry specialization in China
and the di¤erent approaches to measure vertical integration and contracting institutions.
See Section 3 for more detailed discussion.
4Instead, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009) and Macchiavello (2010a) nd that
contracting institutions have an indirect e¤ect on vertical integration through the devel-
opment of nancial institutions (see below for more discussions of these two studies).
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the rm still faces the potential contract disputes between the employer and
the employee. The resolution of both types of contract disputes is a¤ected
by contracting institutions. Hence, the property rights theory produces no
clear-cut predictions on how the vertical boundary is a¤ected by the quality
of contracting institutions.
However, the prevalence of large rms in developing countries with weak
contracting institutions suggests that vertical integration might be able to
mitigate transactions costs to some extent. It is likely that the transaction
costs arising from the holdup problem between two contracting parties in
arms-length transactions are on average more serious than the transaction
costs existing between the employer and the employee in in-house production
in a vertically integrated rm. In arms-length transactions, in addition to
bilateral negotiations, the resolution of the holdup problem relies primarily
on external contract enforcement institutions such as legal courts, whereas
in vertically integrated rms the owners residual control rights may mitigate
to some extent the transactions costs incurred by the disputes between the
employer and the employee. If this is the case, we expect to observe a negative
relationship between vertical integration and contracting institutions, and a
prevalence of vertically integrated rms in developing countries. In other
words, vertical integration is an organizational response to poor contracting
institutions. Nonetheless, this organizational response may well involve an
excessive degree of vertical integration if we use some country with ideal
contracting institutions (such as the U.S.) as a benchmark for comparison.
An excessive degree of vertical integration may considerably reduce levels of
specialization and lead to e¢ ciency losses. Clearly, in this scenario, policy
recommendations for improving contracting institutions are called for, which
will eventually enhance economic growth.
Recently, there has been a renaissance in research about the institutional
determinants of vertical boundary, with a focus on the roles of contracting in-
stitutions and nancial institutions in determining rmsvertical boundary.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009) shows that the quality of contracting
institutions does not have a direct impact on rm vertical boundary deci-
sion, but it has a negative, indirect impact through its interaction with the
quality of nancial institutions. Macchiavello (2010b) focuses on the role of
nancial institutions and shows that its impact on vertical integration de-
pends on industry external nance reliance and industry heterogeneity in
rm size distribution. Pascali (2009) nds that the quality of contracting
institutions a¤ects rm vertical boundary through asset specicity but not
directly. Nonetheless, these studies utilize cross-country rm-level data sets,
which may pose the challenge of controlling for the impacts of political sys-
tem, culture and language, corporate tax policies, and national trade and
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investment policies across countries.
To corroborate our ndings in this new literature on vertical integration
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009; Macchiavello, 2010a, 2010b), we
further investigate the role of nancial institutions and its interaction with
contracting institutions in determining vertical integration. It is found that
nancial institutions overall have no direct impact on vertical integration, but
rms with greater reliance on external nance are less vertically integrated
in regions with better nancial institutions, consistent with the theoretical
prediction of Macchiavello (2010b). Unlike Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton
(2009), however, contracting institutions are found to have no interacting
e¤ect with nancial institutions. Importantly, throughout these exercises,
our main ndings on the direct impact of contracting institutions on vertical
integration remain robust.
Our study is also part of a large and growing literature on the importance
of economic institutions for economic growth (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001, 2002), incentives for investment (e.g., Besley, 1995; Johnson,
McMillan, and Woodru¤, 2002), and corporate decisions such as rm size
(Laeven and Woodru¤, 2007), FDI location choice (Du, Lu, and Tao, 2008)
and family control of business (Lu and Tao, 2009).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the data and variables for the empirical study, while Section 3 presents our
main empirical results. The paper concludes with Section 4.
2 Data and Variables
The data used in this paper comes from the Survey of Chinese Enterprises
(SCE), conducted by the World Bank in cooperation with the Enterprise Sur-
vey Organization of China in early 2003.5 For balanced representation, the
SCE covered 18 cities from ve geographic areas of China: Northeast Benxi,
Changchun, Dalian, and Harbin; Coastal region  Hangzhou, Jiangmen,
Shenzhen, and Wenzhou; Central China  Changsha, Nanchang, Wuhan,
and Zhengzhou; Southwest Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming, and Nanning;
and Northwest Lanzhou and Xian. There are altogether 1,566 rms in
nine manufacturing industries: garment & leather products, electronic equip-
ment, electronic parts making, household electronics, automobile & automo-
bile parts, food processing, chemical products & medicine, biotech products
& Chinese medicine, and metallurgical products.
5It is a cross-sectional data set with most of the variables about rm operation and
performance in 2002, though it also contains some nancial information in the period
2000-2002.
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The dependent variable in our study is the degree of vertical integration
in a rm. Following the literature (i.e., Adelman, 1955; Davies and Morris,
1995), we use the ratio of value added to sales to measure the degree of
vertical integration. Specically, it is constructed as the ratio of the di¤erence
between sales and purchased raw materials to sales and denoted by Value
Added Ratio. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the data. Referring
to Table 1, we can see that the mean value of Value Added Ratio is 0.487
(0.247).
The ratio of value added to sales, however, has the drawback of being
sensitive to the stage of the production process that a rm is specialized in
(Holmes, 1999). Thus, for robustness check, we use an alternative measure of
the degree of vertical integration. Specically, it is constructed on the basis
of the reply to the survey question of how large a proportion of inputs in
terms of value is produced in-house by the rm itself, and denoted by Self-
Made Input Percentage. However, as this measure is based on the subjective
evaluations by managers, it is susceptible to substantial measurement errors.
Indeed, referring to Table 1, we nd that the standard deviation of Self-Made
Input Percentage (0.401) is higher than that ofValue Added Ratio. Since both
measures of vertical integration have their own strengths and weaknesses, we
employ both in our analysis to cross check the robustness of our ndings.
Our key independent variable is the quality of contracting institutions.
Here we follow Johnson, McMillan, and Woodru¤ (2002) and Cull and Xu
(2005), and measure the quality of contracting institutions as the e¤ective-
ness of the legal system in dispute resolution. Specically, in the survey,
there is a question asking CEOs: In your opinion, what is the likelihood
that the legal system will uphold your contracts and property rights in busi-
ness disputes?The answer ranges from zero to 100 percent. The variable,
Contracting Institutions, is constructed based on the responses to the ques-
tion, with a higher value indicating better contracting institutions. Since
most of business disputes are resolved in local courts in China, this variable
reects the perceived quality of contracting institutions in di¤erent cities.6
As shown in Table 1, Contracting Institutions has a mean value of 0.634
and a standard deviation of 0.389, indicating signicant variations across
rms. Part of the variations comes from the inter-city variations in the qual-
ity of contracting institutions. For example, the average quality of contract-
ing institutions is 0.498 in Xian, Shaanxi Province, while the corresponding
number for Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province is 0.712. Indeed, when regressing
6According to the Civil Procedure Law of China (Articles 18-21), the civil lawsuit cases
heard at rst instance are in general taken care of by local courts at the city and county
levels, although the plainti¤ and the defendant have the right of appeal to a higher-level
court.
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Contracting Institutions on industry and city dummies (along with a list of
control variables related to enterprise and CEO characteristics), we nd that
city dummies are highly, statistically signicant but not industry dummies
(results available upon request). This is because that though China has a
unied legal system, there are substantial variations in the interpretation
and enforcement of laws and national ordinances enacted by the central gov-
ernment across Chinas various regions (see, for example, Clarke, 1996 and
Lu and Tao, 2009 for more detailed discussions).7 Our measure, Contracting
Institutions, is based on the enterprises overall perception, thus capturing
the de facto, rather than the de jure, quality of contracting institutions.
However, this subjective measure may su¤er from the endogeneity problem
as well as the measurement error problem. To address these concerns, we
conduct a series of robustness checks.
In a robustness check, we follow Cull and Xu (2005) in using an alter-
native measure of the quality of contracting institutions. Specically, it is
the percentage of business disputes encountered by a rm that are settled by
courts as opposed to government arbitrations and private resolutions, and
denoted by Court Litigation.
In the empirical analysis, we also controlled for other factors that might
possibly a¤ect vertical integration, including rm and CEO characteristics
that are variously used in previous studies (Cull and Xu 2005; Li, Meng,
Wang, and Zhou, 2008), as well as industry, city and industry-city dummies.
Variables related to rm characteristics include: Firm Size (measured
by the logarithm of employment), Firm Age (measured by the logarithm of
the number of years since establishment), Percentage of Private Ownership
(measured by the percentage of ownership held by parties other than govern-
ment agencies), Bank Loans (a dummy variable indicating whether the rm
has any outstanding bank loans), and Degree of Computerization (measured
by the percentage of workforce using computers regularly).8
7Indeed, a survey about Doing Business in Chinaconducted by the World Bank in
2008 reveals substantial di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of courts to resolve business disputes
across Chinas regions. For example, in coastal cities, it takes an average of 230 days
to resolve an uncomplicated commercial dispute, whereas the corresponding number for
Northeastern China is 363 days (World Bank, 2008).
8A larger rm and a rm with a longer history are likely to be more vertically integrated
as the rm has a large production scale and su¢ cient expertise to incorporate a large
number of production stages. A rm with a higher percentage of private ownership could
be more vertically integrated because private enterprises, without government backup,
may be disadvantaged in locating and making deals with intermediate goods suppliers. It
has been argued that underdeveloped nancial intermediaries promote vertical integration
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009). Under credit market imperfections, enterprises
having obtained bank loans are typically those large and well-established rms which are
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Variables related to CEO characteristics include: his/her human capital
Education (years of schooling), Tenure (years as CEO), and Deputy CEO
Previously (an indicator of whether the CEO had been the deputy CEO of
the same enterprise before becoming CEO); and his/her political capital 
Government Cadre Previously (an indicator of whether the CEO had pre-
viously been a government o¢ cial) and Party Membership (an indicator of
whether the CEO was a member of the Chinese Communist Party).9
To deal with the potential endogeneity problems associated with the qual-
ity of contracting institutions, we apply the two-step Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimation method using two alternative instruments. One
instrument is the average response by other rms located in the same city
regarding the quality of contracting institutions (denoted by City Average of
Contracting Institutions). The other instrument is a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the respective city was administered by the Great Britain in
the late Qing Dynasty (denoted by British Administration). We discuss the
identication strategy using these instruments in Section 3.2.
As a further robustness check, we apply the heterogeneous response method
of Rajan and Zingales (1998). Specically, following Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Mitton (2009), we examine whether the quality of contracting institutions has
a greater impact on rm vertical boundary for rms that are more susceptible
to supplier hold-up problems. To measure a rms reliance on external sup-
pliers, we rst use the total number of suppliers (denoted by Suppliers) that
a rm has as in Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Rajan and Subramanian
(2007). Second, same as in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009), we use
the capital intensity, measured by the log of the ratio of xed assets to sales
and denoted by Capital Intensity.10 We expect that rms having a larger
more likely to be vertically integrated by self-producing intermediate goods. The degree
of computerization may well reect the degree of sophistication of the production process
that the enterprises are involved in.
9We expect that CEOs with more education and managerial experience are more likely
to run vertically integrated enterprises because their human capital enables them to co-
ordinate various production stages smoothly. The impact of political capital on vertical
integration may be ambiguous. On the one hand, entrepreneurs endowed with political
capital may be more capable of dealing with suppliers in market transactions by smoothing
the process of obtaining government approval or license etc. On the other hand, entre-
preneurs with political capital may nd it easy to expand production scale by winning
government support so that vertical integration is more likely.
10We use the sample rms capital intensity to measure the vulnerability of rms to
holdup problems. As pointed out by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009), there seems
no much variation in capital intensities of industries across countries. The capital inten-
sities of sample rms should reect the general industry characteristics. This also helps
avoid the di¢ culty of matching the Chinese industry classication with the U.S. one if we
are to use the US industry capital intensity as the benchmark.
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number of suppliers and a higher level of capital intensity are more likely to
encounter severe contract disputes and need contracting institutions to help
resolve disputes.
Finally, to investigate the role of nancial institutions and its interaction
with contracting institutions in determining vertical integration, we construct
two additional variables. The rst one is the measure of nancial institutions,
in which we use a dummy variable indicating whether the rm has any out-
standing bank loans (denoted by Financial Institutions).11 The second one
is the reliance on external nance, measured by 1 minus the ratio of internal
funding for working capital following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and denoted
by External Finance Reliance.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 OLS Estimates
We rst conduct regression analysis with the following specication:
yfic = +  Rfic + "fic; (1)
where yfic is the measure of vertical integration (i.e., Value Added Ratio and
Self-Made Input Percentage) for rm f located in city c and industry i; Rfic
is the quality of contracting institutions perceived by rm f in city c and
industry i; and "fic is the error term. Robust standard error, clustered at
the industry-city level, is used to deal with the heteroskedasticity problem.
Column 1 of Table 2 presents OLS estimate of specication (1). It is found
that Contracting Institutions has a negative and statistically signicant im-
pact on Value Added Ratio. In terms of magnitude, a one-standard-deviation
increase of Contracting Institutions is associated with a decrease of 0:389 
0:053 = 0:021 in Value Added Ratio or 4.3% relative to the mean value of
Value Added Ratio.
The above estimation results, however, could be biased due to the omis-
sion of relevant variables, i.e., E (Rfic  "fic) 6= 0. To the extent that we can
nd a comprehensive set of control variables, Xfic, such that the residual
error term, fic = "fic X 0fic, is not correlated with Rfic, then we can unbi-
asedly estimate the impact of contracting institutions on vertical integration.
11Note this is a rm-level measure, reecting the de facto quality of nancial institutions,
rather than the de jure quality measured at the city-level. So long as rms determine their
vertical boundaries in response to their de facto access to external nance, this rm-level
measure produces a more precise estimate.
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We therefore stepwisely include, as controls, industry dummies, rm char-
acteristics (rm size, rm age, percentage of private ownership, bank loans,
and degree of computerization), CEO characteristics (human capital and po-
litical capital), city dummies, and industry-city dummies. Accordingly, the
new estimation specication is:
yfic = +  Rfic +X 0fic + fic: (2)
Columns 2-7 of Table 2 report the estimation results. It is clear that
among all these specications, Contracting Institutions always has a nega-
tive and statistically signicant impact on Value Added Ratio, implying that
rms perceiving stronger quality of contracting institutions are less vertically
integrated.12
It should be pointed out that our results are in contrast to the ndings by
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009), in which the impacts of contracting
institutions on vertical integration disappear once the industry dummies are
included. Our strikingly di¤erent ndings probably stem from several sources.
Firstly, the e¤ects of industrial structure on rm vertical boundary could
be rather di¤erent in their setting and ours. One way Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Mitton (2009) explains their results is that those countries and regions
with weaker contracting institutions could be more concentrated in indus-
tries that typically have a higher degree of vertical integration. In other
words, countries and regions could choose industry structure or composition
as a means of preventing the adverse e¤ects of weak contracting institutions.
In our setting, it is largely unlikely that a regions industry composition is
shaped by contracting institutions. One prominent feature of the Chinese
industrial structure is that it is fairly congruent across regions. In China,
12Note that in most of these regressions, we include the city dummy and hence the infer-
ence comes largely from the within-city rather than the cross-city variations in the quality
of contracting institutions. In other words, our ndings reect the impact of heterogeneous
institutional access rather than the quality of contracting institutions per se. Given that
rms determine their vertical boundaries in response to the de facto quality of contract-
ing institutions they face, our measure may produce more precise estimates. Nonetheless,
we admit that the rm-level measure may su¤er from the endogeneity problem and the
measurement error problem. To address these concerns, we use various robustness checks
in the following sections, including controlling various entrepreneurial and rm character-
istics and employing the instrumental variable estimation. In addition, to mitigate the
impacts of the variation in institutional access across entrepreneurs in a given city, we also
conduct a reduced-form regression using city-average measure of contracting institutions,
which presumably reects primarily the cross-city variation in de facto contracting insti-
tutions. We obtain qualitatively similar results (available upon request), suggesting that
our results still reect to a large extent the e¤ects of de facto contracting institutions on
rm organization choice.
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considerations for self-su¢ ciency and self-containedness have long been the
guiding principles for industrial structure arrangement. In the pre-reform
cold-war period, the worries for wars breaking out in the east coastal areas
and the wish to accelerate the industrialization and urbanization process of
the countrys western hinterland prompted the central government to relo-
cate a substantial fraction of existing industrial capacity from the east coast
to the western inland regions, and to favor inland areas in the allocation of
new resources for industrial development. As a result, the leadership built a
comprehensive set of industries in each province so that the national econ-
omy would not be severely disrupted even if the country temporarily lost
some provinces, especially east coastal ones, during war times (called Xiao
Er Quan in Chinese, i.e., each region is small but comprehensive). This trend
has continued in the post-reform and post-cold-war era due to the local pro-
tectionism unleashed by the scal decentralization (Young, 2000; Bai, Du,
Tao, and Tong, 2004; Lu and Tao, 2009). Local protectionism deters inter-
regional resource allocation and regional industrial specialization. This lack
of regional specialization prevents regions with weak contracting institutions
from specializing in vertically integrated industries. This may explain why
our results are still robust to the inclusion of industry dummies. Interestingly,
the congruence in the Chinese interregional industrial structure actually pro-
vides an ideal setting to examine the impact of contracting institutions on
rm organizational structure. It minimizes the impact of the choice of re-
gional industrial specialization and industry characteristics on rmsdecision
on vertical boundary. It allows us to focus on how contracting institutions
shapes rmschoice of organizational structure for any given industry.
Secondly, the di¤erence in the measurement of contracting institutions
could account for part of the di¤erences in results. Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Mitton (2009) use various indicators of procedural complexity to gauge the ef-
ciency of contracting institutions across countries. Procedural complexity is
measured by the number of procedures required to collect a commercial debt
or bounced check. These measures are constructed on the basis of some ob-
jective measures reecting de jure aspects of contracting institutions, which
are convenient for international comparison. Nonetheless, as countries di¤er
substantially in the e¢ ciency of the administrative, judicial and commercial
entities, the procedural complexity may not correspond perfectly with the
actual e¢ ciency of contracting institutions. In contrast, we use both the
subjective assessment of contracting institution e¢ ciency and the proportion
of contract disputes resolved through court litigation. Given the national
uniformity of legal procedure across regions in China, our measures could
reect to a large extent the de facto e¢ ciency of contracting institutions in
di¤erent regions. The di¤erent approaches to capturing contracting e¢ ciency
12
could be one additional reason for the di¤erences in ndings.
Finally, the di¤erences in the measurement of vertical integration could
contribute to the di¤erences in the ndings. For cross-country study, Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009) use information from the input-output
table to construct a rm-level vertical integration index, which largely reects
the opportunity for vertical integration. In contrast, we use value added ratio
and the proportion of in-house produced inputs to measure vertical integra-
tion, albeit imperfect and subject to measurement error, are relatively more
direct.
3.2 GMM Estimates
While we have a list of control variables (Xfic), it could still be possible
that residual error term (fic), after controlling Xfic, is correlated with the
quality of contracting institutions (Rfic), i.e., E
 
Rfic  fic
 6= 0, and hence
the estimation results are biased due to this endogeneity issue. Specically,
the residual error term fir can be decomposed into two parts, !fic and fic,
where !fic is a rm/CEO characteristic observed by the rm but not by
the econometrician, while fic is the error term observed by neither the rm
nor the econometrician.13 Hence the correlation between Rfic and fic only
comes from that between Rfic and !fic, i.e., E (Rfic  !fic) 6= 0.
To deal with this endogeneity issue, we adopt the instrumental variable
estimation approach. Specically, we decompose the quality of contracting
institutions (Rfic) perceived by rm f in city c into two parts: the general
quality of contracting institutions at city c (Rc) and a rm-specic idiosyn-
cratic component of contracting institutions (rfic) that is independently and
identically distributed, i.e., Rfic = Rc + rfic.
Our identication strategy depends on whether the general quality of
contracting institutions at city c (Rc) is orthogonal to the unobserved rm
characteristics (!fic), i.e.,
E (Rc  !fic) = 0: (3)
Since the unobserved rm/CEO characteristic, !fic, is the residue after con-
trolling for a host of variables, particularly CEO human capital and political
capital, it is unlikely that this unobserved rm/CEO characteristic would be
correlated with the general quality of contracting institutions in the city.
13Note that all variables at the industry, city and industry-city level have been controlled
by the inclusion of industry and city dummies (Column 6 of Table 2) and industry-city
dummies (Column 7 of Table 2).
13
Given that assumption (3) is satised, the general quality of contracting
institutions in the city, Rc, is a valid instrument for our key explanatory vari-
able, Rfic. Specically, we use the city-level average perception of contracting
institutions among other rms in the same city as the proxy for Rc.
In addition, to check robustness to assumption (3), we also use an alter-
native instrumental variable, viz., the indicator of whether a city was admin-
istered by the Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. This is motivated by
the recent literature on economic institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998).
3.2.1 Instrumental Variable I: Average Assessment of Contracting
Institutions by Other Firms in the Same City
To proxy for the general quality of contracting institutions in city c (Rc), we
use the average assessment of the quality of contracting institutions by other
surveyed rms in the same city. Specically, the rst instrumental variable,
City Average of Contracting Institutions (IV 1fc), for rm f located in city
c is:
IV 1fc =
1
nc   1
X
j2
c
j 6=f
Rjc = Rc +
1
nc   1
X
j2
c
j 6=f
rjc (4)
where 
c is the set of rms located in city c; nc is the number of rms
located in city c; and Rjc is the quality of contracting institutions perceived
by another rm j in city c.
The validity of the instrumental variable estimation hinges upon two con-
ditions, the relevance condition and the exclusion restriction. The relevance
condition means the instrumental variable is correlated with the endogenous
variable, i.e., E (IV 1fc Rfic) 6= 0, which can be conrmed by the regression
analysis and several econometric tests. And given the assumption (3) and
i.i.d. of rfc, we show in the Appendix A.1 that our instrumental variable I
satises the exclusion restriction, i.e.,
E
 
IV 1fc  fic

= 0: (5)
Regression results using this instrumental variable (IV 1fc) are reported in
Column 1 of Table 3.14 The relevance condition of the instrumental variable
is conrmed by the highly signicant correlation between the instrumental
variable (IV 1fc) and the quality of contracting institutions perceived by the
14As the instrumental variable is at the city-level which preclude the use of city dummies,
we include Logarithm of GDP per capita and Logarithm of Population to control for the
city-level general environments.
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rm (Rfic), and the result of the Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic
(Panel B of Table 3). Meanwhile, the concern for weak instrument is ruled
out by the large Shea partial R-squared and the result of the Cragg-Donald
F-statistic (Panel B of Table 3).15
Panel A of Table 3 shows that Contracting Institutions, instrumented by
the average assessment of the quality of contracting institutions by other
surveyed rms in the same city, has a negative and statistically signicant
impact on Value Added Ratio. In Panel C, we report the corresponding
OLS estimate for Contracting Institutions, and the Dubin-Wu-Hausman test.
The insignicance of the Dubin-Wu-Hausman test indicates that the OLS
estimate is statistically not di¤erent from the two-step GMM estimate.
Note that the magnitude of the GMM estimate coe¢ cient of Contracting
Institutions is about 4 times as large as the OLS estimate one. Apparently,
some omitted variables that are correlated with our outcome variable and
the key explanatory variable in the same directions bias the impact of con-
tracting institutions downward in magnitude. For example, a more capable
entrepreneur may on one hand have better connections that help her/him
secure better de facto contract enforcement, and on the other hand be ca-
pable of managing more vertically-integrated businesses. Hence, the lack of
control for entrepreneurial capability may again lead to an underestimation
of the impact of contracting institutions. Another possibility is the existence
of measurement errors associated with the perceived quality of contracting
institutions, which biases the OLS estimates downward in magnitude towards
zero.
In terms of control variables, they mostly produce statistically insignif-
icant estimates. Nonetheless, there are two exceptions. First, the degree
of computerization exhibits positive and signicant estimated coe¢ cients.
This suggests that rms engaged in more technologically advanced produc-
tion have higher value added ratio. The fact that we obtain signicant es-
timated coe¢ cients for Contracting Institutions after including the degree
of computerization demonstrates that our results are unlikely driven by the
concentration of rms with sophisticated technology in regions with weaker
contracting institutions. Second, the Party membership turns out positive
and signicant estimated coe¢ cients. This shows that political capital could
be leveraged by entrepreneurs to di¤erent stages of the production process
so as to facilitate vertical integration.
Further checks on the identication strategy. The identication
strategy of the above two-step GMM estimation lies in that the instrumental
15The Cragg-Donald F-statistic values for our regressions are signicantly above the
value of 10, which is considered as the critical value by Staiger and Stock (1997).
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variable is orthogonal to the error term, i.e., E
 
IV 1c  fic

= 0. A potential
concern is that in China courts are strongly inuenced by the local govern-
ment o¢ cials. This is because the local governments provide nance to the
courts and they also make the appointment of court judges. To address this
concern, we add a variable, Ability of Government O¢ cials (measured by the
city-average perceived percentage of competent o¢ cials among the govern-
ment o¢ cials that the rm regularly interacts with), as an additional control,
and nd that our results remain robust (Column 2 of Table 3).
To further check on this identication strategy, we conduct a test follow-
ing Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002). Specically, we re-write the
orthogonal condition (equation (5)) in the form of mean-independence, i.e.,
E
 
ficjIV 1fc; Rfic; Xfic

= E
 
ficjRfic; Xfic

: (6)
In other words, after the endogenous variable (Rfic) as well as Xfic are con-
trolled for, the instrumental variable (IV 1fc) does not have any partial im-
pact on the outcome variable. As shown in Column 3 of Table 3, in the
reduced-form regression of the outcome variable on the instrumental vari-
able (along with Xfic but not Rfic), the instrumental variable has a negative
and statistically signicant estimated coe¢ cient, which is consistent with our
earlier ndings.16 However, in Column 4 of Table 3, when the endogenous
variable (Rfic) is included as an additional control, the instrumental variable
no longer has any statistical signicance, which implies the satisfaction of
equation (6) and validity of the instrumental variable estimation.
3.2.2 Instrumental Variable II: British Administration in Late
Qing Dynasty
The second instrumental variable we use is a dummy variable (British Admin-
istration) indicating whether a city was administered by the Great Britain
in the late Qing Dynasty of Imperial China, as in Lu and Tao (2009). Mo-
tivated by the recent literature on legal origins (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997 and 1998), Lu and Tao (2009) exploit a unique
historical period in the late Qing dynasty of Imperial China when territo-
ries were administered by di¤erent foreign powers with di¤erent legal origins,
and use British Administration as the instrumental variable for the quality
of contracting institutions (for details on the rationale of this instrumental
16As pointed out by Angrist and Krueger (2001), Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008)
and Angrist and Pischke (2009), if the instrumental variable does not have any statistical
signicance in this reduced-form regression, then it implies that the endogenous variable
may also not have any statistically signicant impact on the outcome variable.
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variable, see Appendix A.2 and Lu and Tao (2009)).17
Regression results using this instrumental variable are summarized in Col-
umn 1 of Table 4. With regard to the relevance condition for an e¤ective in-
strument, British Administration is highly and positively correlated with the
quality of contracting institutions (Rfic). The relevance condition is further
conrmed by the Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic. Meanwhile,
the concern for weak instrument is ruled out by the large Shea partial R-
squared and the result of the Cragg-Donald F-statistic (Panel B of Table 4).
With respect to the central issue of IV regression results, Panel A of Table 4
shows that Contracting Institutions, instrumented by British Administration,
has a negative and statistically signicant impact on Value Added Ratio.
Further checks on the identication strategy. A potential concern
with this instrumental variable estimation is that legal origins are shown
to have impacts on many aspects of the economy other than the quality of
contracting institutions. For example, it has been shown the common law
system is associated with more developed nancial institutions (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998; Djankov, McLiesh, and
Shleifer, 2007), less regulation of entry and less corruption (Djankov, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002), lower government ownership
of banks and lower interest rates (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer,
2002), higher quality of government services (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999), and lower levels of labor regulation (Botero,
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004). These other as-
pects of the economy could potentially a¤ect the rms willingness to verti-
cally integrate. For example, more stringent government regulation of entry
could result in the prevalence of large-scale rms that are more likely to be
vertically integrated. If these other aspects of the economy cast signicant
impacts on a rms willingness to vertically integrate, it means that legal ori-
gins may a¤ect our outcome variable through channels other than the quality
of contracting institutions, causing the violation of the exclusion restriction
of the instrumental variable estimation.
To address the above concern, we construct additional control variables
related to each of these possible channels, and stepwisely include them in the
regression as robustness checks. Specically, we include Ability of Govern-
ment O¢ cials (measured by the city-average perceived percentage of compe-
tent o¢ cials among the government o¢ cials that the rm regularly interacts
with) as a proxy for the quality of government services, Regulation of La-
bor (measured by the percentage of rms having labor redundancy), Interest
17Similarly, Berkowtiz and Clay (2005, 2006) also look at the relation between the legal
origin and the quality of contracting institutions within the United States.
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Rate (measured by the city-average annual interest rate), Financial Develop-
ment (measured by the percentage of rms having outstanding bank loans),
and Regulation of Entry (measured by the city average ratio of the uno¢ cial
payment to the total costs of obtaining a registration or license).
As shown in Columns 2-6 of Table 4, our main result concerning the im-
pact of the quality of contracting institutions on vertical integration remains
robust to these controls.
3.3 Heterogeneous Response Estimation
As a further robustness check, we apply the heterogeneous response method
of Rajan and Zingales (1998). The identication of this method hinges upon
the theoretical mechanisms through which contracting institutions may a¤ect
vertical integration.
According to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009)s theory, the quality
of contracting institutions has a greater impact on rm vertical boundary for
rms that are more susceptible to supplier hold-up problems. It is expected
that rms dealing with many suppliers or having high capital intensity are
more reliant on external suppliers and are thus more likely to encounter
supplier holdup problems. Specically, we estimate the following equation:
yfic = +  Rfic +  Rfic  Sfic +   Sfic +X 0fic + fic; (7)
where Sfic is a measure of rmsreliance on external suppliers, which is either
the total number of suppliers as used by Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and
Rajan and Subramanian (2007) or the capital intensity, i.e. the logarithm of
the ratio of xed assets to total sales, as in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton
(2009).
Regression results are reported in Table 5, in which the total number
of suppliers is used in Column 1 whereas the capital intensity is used in
Column 2. Clearly, in both cases, it is found that indeed the impact of
contracting institutions on vertical integration is greater for rms that rely
more heavily on external suppliers, consistent with the theoretical predictions
and empirical ndings of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009). Moreover,
the direct e¤ect of contracting institutions on vertical integration remains
robust in these exercises.
3.4 Robustness Checks
We conduct six other sets of robustness checks of the impact of the quality of
contracting institutions on vertical integration. First, we use an alternative
18
measure of vertical integration, i.e., the percentage of inputs in terms of
value that is produced in-house by the rm itself (denoted by Self-Made
Input Percentage). The OLS and the two-step GMM (using the average
assessment of the quality of contracting institutions by other surveyed rms
in the same city as the instrument) estimates are reported in Columns 1-2 of
Table 6, respectively. It is found that the quality of contracting institutions
has a negative impact on vertical integration in both regressions, though
only the two-step GMM estimate is statistically signicant. Meanwhile, the
Dubin-Wu-Hausman test is statistically signicant, implying that the OLS
estimate may be biased due to the endogeneity issue and/or the measurement
error problem.
Second, we use an alternative measure of the quality of contacting institu-
tions, i.e., the percentage of business disputes encountered by a rm that are
settled by courts (denoted by Court Litigation). The OLS and the two-step
GMM (using the average assessment of the quality of contracting institutions
by other surveyed rms in the same city as the instrument) estimates are re-
ported in Columns 3-4 of Table 6, respectively. It is found that the quality
of contracting institutions still has a negative impact on vertical integration
in both regressions, though only the OLS estimate is statistically signicant.
Meanwhile, the Dubin-Wu-Hausman test is statistically insignicant, indi-
cating that the two-step GMM estimate is not statistically di¤erent from the
OLS estimate.
Third, for rms with many businesses, the degree of vertical integration
could vary from one business to another. Thus our measure of vertical inte-
gration may reect the average degree of vertical integration across various
businesses, which may bias our estimations of the impacts of the quality of
contracting institutions on vertical integration. To alleviate this concern,
we focus on the sub-sample of rms with focused business (dened as rms
whose main business contributes at least 90% to their total sales). The re-
sults shown in Columns 1-2 of Table 7 suggest that our main ndings remain
robust to this sub-sample.
Fourth, Chinas state-owned rms were the main players under the central
planning system. Even during Chinas economic transition, state-owned rms
are favored by the government, thus enjoying better de facto treatment from
contracting institutions. At the same time, inuenced by the principle of
self-su¢ ciency under the central planning system, state-owned rms have
continued to be vertically integrated. To make sure that our results are not
biased due to the inclusion of these state-owned rms, we focus on the sub-
sample of private rms (dened as rms with private ownership accounting
for at least 90% shares). As shown in Columns 3-4 of Table 7, our main
ndings remain robust to this sub-sample.
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Lastly, one may be concerned that our results could be driven by larger
rms that are more likely to vertically integrate and thus less prone to the
risks of poor contracting institutions. To deal with this concern, we focus
on the subsample of smaller rms (excluding the top 10% rms in terms
of employment).18 As shown in Columns 5-6 of Table 7, the impacts of the
quality of contracting institutions on vertical integration remain negative and
signicant.
3.5 The Role of Financial Institutions
The recent literature on the relationship between institutional quality and
vertical integration has paid much attention to the importance of nancial
institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson, Mitton (2009) nd no direct e¤ects of
contracting institutions and nancial development on the extent of verti-
cal integration, but detect greater vertical integration in countries that have
both weaker contracting institutions and better nancial development. Mac-
chiavello (2010b) shows that the impact of nancial institutions on vertical
integration is complicated, hinging upon the rm size distribution within
an industry. Specically, it argues that in an industry where small rms
are more prevalent, nancial institutions reduce the degree of vertical inte-
gration. This is expected to hold in our data set as the rms in our data
are relatively small. Following Macchiavello (2010a), we thus estimate the
following equation:
yfic = +   Ffic +   Ffic  Efic +   Efic +X 0fic + fic; (8)
where Fficmeasures the quality of nancial institutions; and Efic is a measure
of external nance reliance (à la Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Regression results are reported in Table 8. In Column 1, we only include
the single term of the quality of nancial institutions, and nd that it does
not have any direct e¤ect on vertical integration, in line with the complicated
relations between nancial institutions and vertical integration elucidated by
Macchiavello (2010b). In Column 2, we interact nancial institutions with
the external nance reliance, and nd that rms with greater reliance on
external nance are less vertically integrated when facing better nancial
institutions.19 Given the small rm size nature of our sample, this nding
18Results are similar when the top 25% or top 50% rms are excluded from the sample.
19Estimation using external nance reliance data of U.S. industries (adopted from Rajan
and Zingales, 1998) shows that the interaction term is also negative, albeit statistically
insignicant. Presumably this is due to the imperfect matching between the U.S. industry
classication and the industry classication used in our data.
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is consistent with the theoretical predictions and the empirical ndings of
Macchiavello (2010b).
In Columns 3-4, we add the quality of contracting institutions and its
interaction term with external nance reliance. It is found that the quality of
contracting institutions remains to have negative and statistically signicant
impact on vertical integration, reinforcing our main results in earlier sections.
Meanwhile, the interacting role of nancial institutions with external nance
reliance remains robust to the control of contracting institutions, implying
the importance of nancial institutions for rm vertical boundary decision.
Lastly, in Column 5, we further include the interaction term between
nancial institutions and contracting institutions. It is found that unlike
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009), contracting institutions do not have
di¤erential impact on vertical integration through nancial institutions. Un-
derstandably, as argued by Macchiavello (2010b), the impact of nancial
institutions on vertical integration is to be complicated, and it mainly func-
tions through interactions with rm external nance reliance and rm size
distribution within an industry.
4 Conclusion
The make-or-buy decision is an important one for business strategy, rm per-
formance, and ultimately economic growth. In explaining the determinants of
vertical integration, the existing literature mainly focuses on contractual in-
completeness and asset specicity by taking for granted that there are sound
contracting institutions. Given that the quality of contracting institutions
is imperfect even in some developed economies and far more problematic
in developing countries, the investigation of the impacts of the quality of
contracting institutions on vertical integration is highly needed.
In this paper, using a data set of manufacturing rms in China, we in-
vestigate how the variations in the quality of contracting institutions across
Chinas cities a¤ect the degree of vertical integration. We nd that the
quality of contracting institutions has a negative and signicant impact on
vertical integration. The results are robust to the inclusion of a comprehen-
sive list of controls variables, to the use of instrumental variable estimation
and the heterogeneous response estimation, to alternative measures of key
variables, to the use of various sub-samples, and to the control for the quality
of nancial institutions. Our ndings highlight the importance of contracting
institutions on rm organizational choice, and o¤er potential policy recom-
mendations as the organization choice subsequently a¤ects rm performance
and economic growth.
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Appendix A.1
Proof of Equation (5)
E
 
IV 1fc  fic

= E
0BB@
2664Rc + 1nc   1X
j2
c
j 6=f
rjc
3775  fic
1CCA
= E
0BB@
0BB@Rc + 1nc   1X
j2
c
j 6=f
rjc
1CCA  !fic
1CCA
= E (Rc  !fic) + E
0BB@ 1nc   1X
j2
c
j 6=f
rjc  !fic
1CCA = 0;
where the last equality comes from assumption (3) and i.i.d. of rfc.
Appendix A.2
During the late Qing Dynasty (1840-1911), China was defeated in a series
of wars against foreign powers, including two Opium Wars with the Great
Britain, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the Boxer Rebellion. In
the wake of military defeats, the Qing government was forced to sign un-
equal treaties including territorial concessions. The wave of territorial par-
titioning climaxed at the end of the nineteenth century. The Great Britain
administered nine regions (Guizhou, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, An-
hui, Jiangsu, Henan, and Zhejiang provinces); France controlled Yunnan,
Hainan, Guangxi, and the majority of Guangdong province; Germany ad-
ministered Shandong province; Japan governed Fujian province; and Russia
controlled Xinjiang, Mongolia, and the three north-eastern provinces (Qian,
1948). Shanghai and Tianjin, the two leading commercial centers of China
at the time, were divided into various foreign concessions.
Three main reasons account for the geographical pattern of territorial par-
titioning by the foreign powers. First, the geographic proximity between the
foreign powers and Chinas regions is a primary force in shaping the pattern of
territorial concessions (Dougherty and Pfaltzgra¤, 2000). For example, Rus-
sia, located to the north of China, occupied most of Chinas northern regions
such as Xinjiang, Mongolia, and the three northeastern provinces. France,
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stepping from its colony of Vietnam that lies to the southwest of China, ex-
tended its colonial power to the four southwestern provinces in China, i.e.,
Yunnan, Hainan, Guangxi, and the majority of Guangdong province (Yang,
2006). Japan, defeated by Russia in its aggression in the Northeast China,
chose to occupy Chinas regions such as Taiwan and Fujian that are close
to its southern territories. The second reason for the territorial partitioning
is for the control of certain products that the foreign powers needed at the
time. For example, the Great Britain, which was a big importer of tea and
silk from China, chose to occupy those regions in China that produced these
two products (Sa and Pan, 1996). Finally, the territorial occupation of Ger-
many, a power which was late in joining the occupation of China, was a result
of bargaining and negotiation with other foreign powers (China History So-
ciety, 1959). Hence, the geographical pattern of territorial concessions had
nothing to do with the initial institutional strength and the industrial de-
velopment capacity of di¤erent regions. It can be regarded as an exogenous
process. On the contrary, the quasi-colonial experience contributes to the
variations in institutional strength across regions in China.
Within their respective domains of control, the foreign powers e¤ectively
established their sovereign authorities (McAleavy, 1967). Typically, the for-
eign powers imposed their own civil and military administration, including
legal system, police, and education (Dong, Zhang, and Jiao 2000). In par-
ticular, lawsuits taking place in those domains controlled by foreign powers
were adjudicated using the legal systems of respective reigning foreign pow-
ers (e.g., Yang and Ye, 1993; Tan, 1996). The foreign powers imposed their
own civil and military administration by force and hence, the administrative
systems could be considered as being exogenous to the local communities.
Contemporary China is a united sovereign nation with a unied legal sys-
tem. However, there are substantial variations in the interpretation and en-
forcement of laws and national ordinances enacted by the central government
across Chinas various regions (e.g., Clarke, 1996). Due to the substantial
variations in endowments, technologies and economic development across re-
gions in China, local governments often issue various rules and regulations
regarding laws and national ordinances so as to make them more adapted
to the local circumstances (e.g., Chen, 2004; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting,
2008). Furthermore, the enforcement of rules and regulations hinges upon
the cooperation of local people as well as local authorities (e.g., Fan, 1985;
Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Zhao, 1989; Li, Zhang, and Wang, 1990;
Clarke, 1991), which again varies substantially across Chinas regions due to
the di¤erences in culture, beliefs, and ideologies (e.g., Tai, 1957; Cheng, Liu,
and Cheng, 1982; Yearbook of Peoples Court, 1990; Clarke, 1996).
The imposition of the legal systems by the foreign powers in various parts
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of China in the late Qing Dynasty is expected to inuence not only the legal
rules and the legal institutions (including judicial independence and legal
procedures) at that time, but also the fundamental legal culture, i.e., human
capital and beliefs of the key participants in the legal systems (Zweigert and
Kotz, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008). Indeed, the for-
eign powers in China were actively engaged in transplanting and cultivating
their beliefs and ideologies to the local people by setting up and operat-
ing schools and colleges. Speaking at the Second Protestantism Propagators
Congress held in Shanghai in China in 1890, F.L. Hawks Pott, President
of Saint Johns University, declared that in our school, we trained Chinas
future teachers and propagators, making them the leaders and comperes in
the future and casting the greatest inuences on the future China (Yang
and Ye 1993). The legal institutions, human capital and beliefs that were
transplanted and cultivated by di¤erent foreign powers are expected to per-
sist over time (Zweigert and Kotz, 1998; Balas, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer, 2009). Indeed, there is a growing body of literature on the per-
sistence of culture, beliefs, and ideologies over time (e.g., Bisin and Verdier,
2000; Dohmen, Falk, Hu¤man, and Sunde, 2006; Tabellini, 2007a, 2007b,
2009). The persistent legal culture shapes the beliefs and behavioral pat-
terns of the current generation. The regional variation in legal culture could
determine the variation in the de facto law enforcement across regions. The
leeway that each region enjoys in interpreting national laws and ordinances
and adapting them to local circumstances serves as a medium through which
the variation in the legal culture could be revealed in the current legal prac-
tices, including the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement.
The foreign powers belong to di¤erent legal families. According to La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998), legal origin a¤ects
the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement. Specically, contract enforcement
is more e¤ective under the common law system used by the Great Britain
than under the civil law system used by France, Germany, Japan, and Russia
(e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Accordingly, we expect that the local
legal and business culture in the British-administered regions in China may
be more conducive to contract enforcement than those in regions under the
administration of other foreign powers. Hence, we take whether a city of
China was administered by the Great Britain during the late Qing Dynasty
as a reasonable instrument for the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement in
2002.20
20Nine out of the eighteen cities (Changsha, Chongqing, Guiyang, Hangzhou, Nanchang,
Shenzhen, Wenzhou, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou) in our sample were administered by the
Great Britain, and the rest of the sample was occupied by France or Russia.
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En  Table 1, Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Value Added Ratio 1349 0.487  0.247  0.006  1.000  
Contracting Institutions 1361 0.634  0.389  0.000  1.000  
City Average of Contracting Institutions 1361 0.634  0.125  0.444  0.878  
British Administration 1566 0.510  0.500  0.000  1.000  
Firm Size 1563 5.040  1.453  0.000  9.899  
Firm Age 1566 2.494  0.777  1.099  3.970  
Percentage of Private Ownership 1566 0.796  0.389  0.000  1.000  
Bank Loans/Financial Institutions 1540 0.273  0.446  0.000  1.000  
Degree of Computerization 1548 0.222  0.265  0.000  1.000  
Education 1553 15.359  2.511  0.000  19.000  
Tenure 1548 6.240  4.580  1.000  33.000  
Deputy CEO Before 1548 0.280  0.449  0.000  1.000  
Government Cadre 1548 0.036  0.185  0.000  1.000  
Party Membership 1524 0.648  0.478  0.000  1.000  
Logarithm of GDP per capita 1566 0.420  0.592  -0.457  2.784  
Logarithm of Population 1566 6.303  0.664  4.938  8.044  
Ability of Government Officials 1566 0.517  0.084  0.365  0.649  
Regulation of Labor 1566 0.272  0.097  0.150  0.500  
Interest Rate 1566 0.055  0.010  0.034  0.078  
Financial Development 1566 0.028  0.026  0.000  0.080  
Regulation of Entry 1566 0.710  0.102  0.565  0.924  
Suppliers 1509 0.042 0.199 0.000 7.100 
Capital Intensity 1538 5.718 70.490 0.0002 2267.389 
External Finance Reliance 1276 0.869 0.292 0.000 1.000 
Self-Made Input Percentage 1459 0.339  0.401  0.000  1.000  
Court Litigation 1543 0.044  0.171  0.000  1.000  
Table 2, OLS estimates 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent Variable Value Added Ratio 
Contracting Institutions -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.049** -0.047** 
  [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.022] 
Firm Characteristics        
Firm Size   0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 
    [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
Firm Age   0.016 0.018* 0.018* 0.015 0.010 
    [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] 
Percentage of Private Ownership   -0.003 0.018 0.018 0.011 0.013 
    [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.022] [0.024] 
Bank Loans   0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 
    [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019] 
Degree of Computerization    0.060* 0.060* 0.070** 0.057 
     [0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.038] 
CEO Characteristics        
Human Capital        
Education    0.006* 0.005 0.003 0.003 
     [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] 
Tenure    -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
     [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Deputy CEO Before    0.011 0.007 0.009 0.009 
    [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] 
Political Capital        
Government Cadre     -0.047 -0.046 -0.049 
      [0.047] [0.047] [0.051] 
Party Membership     0.035** 0.024 0.029* 
      [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] 
Industry Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
City Dummy      Yes  
Industry-city Dummy       Yes 
Constant 0.523*** 0.761*** 0.727*** 0.619*** 0.590*** 0.547*** 0.081 
  [0.015] [0.083] [0.108] [0.116] [0.118] [0.123] [0.084] 
Observations 1183 1183 1167 1140 1118 1118 1118 
R-squared 0.0069 0.0374 0.0437 0.0503 0.0569 0.0836 0.1626 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3, GMM estimates I 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Estimation  GMM OLS 
Panel A Second Stage: Dependent Variable is Value Added Ratio 
Dependent Variable is 
Value Added Ratio 
Contracting Institutions -0.200** -0.275*  -0.049** 
  [0.085] [0.142]  [0.020] 
City Average of Contracting Institutions   -0.200** -0.165 
   [0.100] [0.100] 
Firm Characteristics     
Firm Size 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.000 
  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Firm Age 0.013 0.011 0.021** 0.019* 
  [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] 
Percentage of Private Ownership 0.007 0.000 0.023 0.019 
  [0.023] [0.026] [0.020] [0.020] 
Bank Loans 0.006 0.011 -0.004 -0.001 
  [0.018] [0.020] [0.016] [0.017] 
Degree of Computerization 0.080** 0.092** 0.054 0.061* 
  [0.035] [0.038] [0.035] [0.034] 
CEO Characteristics     
Human Capital     
Education 0.004 0.003 0.005* 0.005 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
Tenure 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Deputy CEO Before 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.008 
 [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] 
Political Capital     
Government Cadre -0.052 -0.055 -0.046 -0.047 
  [0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.047] 
Party Membership 0.033** 0.031* 0.034** 0.033** 
  [0.014] [0.016] [0.014] [0.014] 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Characteristics     
Logarithm of GDP per capita  -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 
  [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022] 
Logarithm of Population 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.027 
  [0.021] [0.021] [0.019] [0.020] 
Ability of Government Officials  0.150 0.070 0.084 
   [0.187] [0.139] [0.143] 
Constant 0.311*** 0.299** 0.479*** 0.492*** 
  [0.113] [0.121] [0.150] [0.149] 
Panel B First Stage: Dependent Variable   
is Contracting Institutions 
City Average of Contracting Institutions 0.852*** 0.729***   
 [0.110] [0.113]   
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic [48.44]*** [26.97]***   
Shea Partial R-squared 0.0519 0.0243   
Cragg-Donald F-statistic [58.02] [28.22]   
Panel C Corresponding OLS estimates   
Contracting Institutions -0.056*** -0.054***   
 [0.020] [0.020]   
Dubin-Wu-Hausman Test [2.59] [2.55]   
Observations 1118 1118 1118 1118 
Note: In Columns 1-2, the first stage of the GMM estimates and the corresponding OLS estimates include the same 
control variables as in the second stage of the GMM estimates but the estimated coefficients of these control variables 
are not reported to save space (available upon request). Standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are reported in 
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 4, GMM estimates II 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Panel A Second Stage: Dependent Variable is Value Added Ratio 
Contracting Institutions -0.527* -0.418** -0.467** -0.494** -0.414** -0.336* 
  [0.309] [0.196] [0.211] [0.210] [0.202] [0.180] 
Firm Characteristics       
Firm Size 0.010 0.008 0.01 0.011 0.010 0.009 
  [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] 
Firm Age 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.006 
  [0.017] [0.013] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.013] 
Percentage of Private Ownership -0.017 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 -0.009 -0.003 
  [0.037] [0.031] [0.032] [0.033] [0.031] [0.028] 
Bank Loans 0.023 0.019 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.018 
  [0.025] [0.021] [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.021] 
Degree of Computerization 0.119** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.123*** 0.111*** 0.102** 
  [0.050] [0.042] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043] [0.041] 
CEO Characteristics       
Human Capital       
Education 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] 
Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Deputy CEO Before -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
 [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] 
Political Capital       
Government Cadre -0.058 -0.06 -0.064 -0.065 -0.063 -0.061 
  [0.054] [0.051] [0.052] [0.053] [0.050] [0.048] 
Party Membership 0.029 0.028 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.024 
  [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] [0.021] [0.019] [0.017] 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Characteristics       
Logarithm of GDP per capita  0.024 0.000 0.033 0.027 0.033 0.057 
  [0.034] [0.025] [0.031] [0.035] [0.032] [0.037] 
Logarithm of Population 0.073 0.038 0.059** 0.056* 0.063** 0.073** 
  [0.047] [0.025] [0.029] [0.031] [0.029] [0.030] 
Ability of Government Officials  0.285 0.241 0.310 0.183 0.002 
   [0.234] [0.232] [0.258] [0.254] [0.242] 
Regulation of Labor   -0.203* -0.190 -0.184* -0.221** 
    [0.113] [0.117] [0.105] [0.101] 
Interest Rate    -0.629 -0.901 -0.931 
     [1.106] [1.072] [0.982] 
Financial Development     -0.156 -0.215** 
      [0.096] [0.102] 
Regulation of Entry      -0.500 
       [0.468] 
Constant 0.292** 0.283** 0.358** 0.396** 0.393** 0.398*** 
  [0.139] [0.134] [0.149] [0.167] [0.161] [0.149] 
Panel B First Stage: Dependent Variable is Contracting Institutions 
British Administration 0.073** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.118*** 0.139*** 
 [0.033] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027] [0.031] 
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR 
Statistic [7.43]*** [15.20]*** [14.78]*** [16.55]*** [17.57]*** [19.01]*** 
Shea Partial R-squared 0.075 0.0148 0.0145 0.0159 0.0166 0.0187 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic [7.28] [15.21] [14.84] [16.69] [17.49] [18.68] 
Panel C Corresponding OLS estimates 
Contracting Institutions -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
Dubin-Wu-Hausman Test [3.37]** [3.96]** [5.03]** [5.52]** [4.05]** [2.98]* 
Observations 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118 
Note: The first stage of the GMM estimates and the corresponding OLS estimates include the same control variables as in the 
second stage of the GMM estimates but the estimated coefficients of these control variables are not reported to save space 
(available upon request). Standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Table 5, Heterogeneous response estimates 
 
  1 2 
Dependent Variable Value Added Ratio 
Contracting Institutions -0.047** -0.051** 
  [0.022] [0.021] 
Contracting Institutions * Suppliers -0.231*  
 [0.136]  
Suppliers 0.005  
 [0.010]  
Contacting Institutions * Capital Intensity  -0.002* 
  [0.001] 
Capital Intensity  0.002*** 
  [0.001] 
Firm Characteristics   
Firm Size 0.007 0.004 
  [0.008] [0.007] 
Firm Age 0.008 0.010 
  [0.012] [0.011] 
Percentage of Private Ownership 0.012 0.013 
  [0.024] [0.024] 
Bank Loans -0.005 0.000 
  [0.020] [0.020] 
Degree of Computerization 0.058 0.058 
  [0.039] [0.038] 
CEO Characteristics   
Human Capital   
Education 0.003 0.003 
  [0.004] [0.003] 
Tenure 0.000 0.000 
  [0.002] [0.002] 
Deputy CEO Before 0.008 0.011 
 [0.016] [0.016] 
Political Capital   
Government Cadre -0.044 -0.038 
  [0.050] [0.051] 
Party Membership 0.027* 0.029* 
  [0.015] [0.015] 
Industry-city Dummy Yes Yes 
Constant 0.050 0.049 
  [0.085] [0.083] 
Observations 1101 1110 
R-squared 0.1662 0.1685 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are reported in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6, Alternative measures 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Estimation OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Dependent Variable Self-Made Input Percentage Value Added Ratio 
Contracting Institutions -0.030 -0.239**   
  [0.032] [0.112]   
Court Litigation   -0.078*** -0.305 
    [0.024] [0.424] 
Firm Characteristics     
Firm Size 0.012 0.017* -0.001 0.001 
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.007] 
Firm Age 0.023 0.018 0.023** 0.025** 
  [0.019] [0.020] [0.010] [0.011] 
Percentage of Private Ownership 0.048 0.034 0.013 0.012 
  [0.031] [0.034] [0.020] [0.020] 
Bank Loans 0.018 0.025 -0.008 -0.004 
  [0.026] [0.027] [0.015] [0.018] 
Degree of Computerization -0.009 0.017 0.069** 0.070** 
  [0.049] [0.055] [0.030] [0.028] 
CEO Characteristics     
Human Capital     
Education 0.008* 0.007 0.005 0.005 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] 
Tenure 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
Deputy CEO Before 0.025 0.021 0.012 0.012 
 [0.023] [0.024] [0.014] [0.014] 
Political Capital     
Government Cadre -0.146*** -0.154*** -0.047 -0.041 
  [0.052] [0.055] [0.048] [0.051] 
Party Membership -0.008 -0.010 0.041*** 0.045*** 
  [0.028] [0.027] [0.013] [0.013] 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Characteristics     
Logarithm of GDP per capita  -0.031 -0.010 -0.013 -0.003 
  [0.025] [0.031] [0.018] [0.024] 
Logarithm of Population -0.009 0.022 0.01 0.018 
  [0.021] [0.030] [0.015] [0.021] 
Constant 0.153 0.233 0.316** 0.250** 
  [0.170] [0.173] [0.122] [0.119] 
Tests     
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic  [48.52]***  [9.16]*** 
Shea Partial R-squared  0.0475  0.081 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic  [57.55]  [9.26] 
Dubin-Wu-Hausman Test  [3.29]*  [0.29] 
Observations 1222 1222 1251 1251 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 7, Sub-samples 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Estimation OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Sub-sample Firms with Focused Business Private Firms Small Firms 
Dependent Variable Value Added Ratio Value Added Ratio Value Added Ratio 
Contracting Institutions -0.088*** -0.210** -0.075*** -0.254** -0.057*** -0.227** 
  [0.029] [0.088] [0.023] [0.110] [0.019] [0.088] 
Firm Characteristics       
Firm Size -0.004 -0.005 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.003 
  [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] 
Firm Age 0.022 0.020 0.010 0.004 0.021* 0.015 
  [0.015] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.011] [0.011] 
Percentage of Private Ownership 0.019 0.005 -2.067 -2.726 0.000 -0.014 
  [0.029] [0.032] [1.719] [1.795] [0.022] [0.025] 
Bank Loans 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.012 0.002 0.012 
  [0.021] [0.022] [0.020] [0.021] [0.018] [0.019] 
Degree of Computerization 0.100** 0.116*** 0.039 0.065 0.061 0.084** 
  [0.044] [0.044] [0.038] [0.040] [0.037] [0.038] 
CEO Characteristics       
Human Capital       
Education 0.005 0.004 0.007* 0.005 0.006 0.004 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Tenure -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Deputy CEO Before 0.025 0.025 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
 [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] 
Political Capital       
Government Cadre -0.066 -0.052 -0.061 -0.063 -0.081 -0.087* 
  [0.057] [0.058] [0.059] [0.057] [0.050] [0.050] 
Party Membership 0.051** 0.049** 0.040*** 0.039** 0.038*** 0.036** 
  [0.020] [0.020] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.015] 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Characteristics       
Logarithm of GDP per capita  0.005 0.02 -0.002 0.016 -0.018 -0.002 
  [0.024] [0.025] [0.023] [0.027] [0.024] [0.025] 
Logarithm of Population 0.016 0.034 0.016 0.044 0.009 0.032 
  [0.020] [0.023] [0.021] [0.028] [0.018] [0.023] 
Constant 0.324** 0.292** 2.55 2.972* 0.376** 0.323** 
  [0.156] [0.133] [1.719] [1.789] [0.146] [0.126] 
Tests       
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic  [38.96]***  [41.01]***  [47.72]*** 
Shea Partial R-squared  0.671  0.571  0.590 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic  [51.59]  [49.68]  [57.74] 
Dubin-Wu-Hausman Test  [1.84]  [2.38]  [3.27]* 
Observations 716 716 862 862 998 998 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8, Role of financial institutions 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable Value Added Ratio 
Contracting Institutions   -0.047** -0.275*** -0.279*** 
    [0.022] [0.064] [0.064] 
Contracting Institutions * External Finance Reliance    0.265*** 0.264*** 
    [0.071] [0.072] 
Financial Institutions -0.001 0.103* -0.003 0.115** 0.104 
 [0.017] [0.061] [0.019] [0.056] [0.067] 
Financial Institutions * External Finance Reliance  -0.110*  -0.129** -0.130** 
  [0.068]  [0.062] [0.062] 
External Finance Reliance  0.020  -0.140** -0.139** 
  [0.030]  [0.057] [0.057] 
Contracting Institutions * Financial Institutions     0.016 
     [0.051] 
Firm Characteristics      
Firm Size 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.006 
  [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] 
Firm Age 0.020* 0.026* 0.01 0.02 0.02 
  [0.011] [0.014] [0.011] [0.014] [0.014] 
Percentage of Private Ownership 0.01 0.003 0.013 0.011 0.011 
  [0.023] [0.026] [0.024] [0.027] [0.027] 
Degree of Computerization 0.076** 0.051 0.057 0.034 0.035 
  [0.035] [0.036] [0.038] [0.038] [0.039] 
CEO Characteristics      
Human Capital      
Education 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Tenure -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Deputy CEO Before 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.011 
 [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] 
Political Capital      
Government Cadre -0.052 -0.075 -0.049 -0.077 -0.076 
  [0.050] [0.046] [0.051] [0.048] [0.048] 
Party Membership 0.033** 0.027* 0.029* 0.029* 0.029* 
  [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] 
Industry-city Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.760*** -0.02 0.081 0.119 0.121 
  [0.059] [0.084] [0.084] [0.081] [0.081] 
Observations 1263 1075 1118 954 954 
R-squared 0.1454 0.1795 0.1626 0.2173 0.2174 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at industry-city level, are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
